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COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYERS CAN'T TACKLE
ATHLETIC CONFERENCE'S TOUGH SANCTIONS:
HAIRSTON v. PACIFIC 10 CONFERENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of intercollegiate athletics began with the for-
mation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in
1906.1 In order to promote its purposes, 2 the NCAA has developed
an extensive set of rules and regulations to govern intercollegiate
athletics. 3 These rules are enforced through a disciplinary system
which gives the NCAA and the NCAA member conferences4 the
power to levy appropriate sanctions on a violating institution's ath-
1. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1984) (describing
NCAA's role in regulating college athletics). Colleges participating in intercollegi-
ate athletics originally formed the NCAA in 1906 to promulgate rules of play for
football in response to an increasing number of game-related injuries and deaths.
See Greg Heller, Preparing for the Storm: The Representation of a University Accused of
Violating NCAA Regulations, 7 MAiQ. SPORTS L.J. 295 (1996). From there, the
NCAA slowly began to govern all areas of intercollegiate athletics on a national
level. See id. Today, the NCAA is a complex governing body, composed of numer-
ous councils and committees, made up of approximately 1000 member institutions
and 110 member conferences. See id. at 299 (footnotes omitted).
2. See NCAA Const. art. 1.2, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 1 (1994). The
NCAA includes as its "purposes":
(a) To initiate, stimulate and improve inter-collegiate athletics programs
for student-athletes and to promote and develop educational leadership,
physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as a recre-
ational pursuit; (b) To uphold the principle of institutional control of,
and responsibility for, all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the
constitution and bylaws of this Association; (c) To encourage its members
to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of scholar-
ship, sportsmanship and amateurism..; (h) To legislate, through bylaws
or by resolutions of a Convention, upon any subject of general concern to
the members related to the administration of intercollegiate athletics;
and (i) To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate ath-
letics and establish standards whereby the colleges and universities of the
United States can maintain their athletics programs on a high level.
Id. The NCAA Constitution states that, "[a] basic purpose of this Association is to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athletes as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports." See NCAA Const. art. 1.3.1, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 1 (1994).
3. See generally NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1994-95 NCAA
MANuAL (1994) (providing volume of over 500 pages containing NCAA Constitu-
tion, Operating Bylaws, Administrative Bylaws and Administrative Organization).
4. For a discussion of the NCAA's definition of "member conference," see
infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
(365)
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letic program.5 Occasionally, the NCAA has faced legal challenges
to the validity of its regulations and sanctions.6 Not until recently,
however, in Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference,7 has a member confer-
ence faced a similar claim against its sanctioning of one of its own
member institutions. In Hairston, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of a federal antitrust claim and a third-
party beneficiary breach of contract claim brought by five collegiate
football players against their NCAA member conference. 8
Cases involving intercollegiate athletics are important in the
development of areas of the law such as antitrust and contracts be-
cause of the unique relationship the NCAA and its member confer-
ences have with the member institutions and student-athletes.9 A
challenge to sanctions imposed by a member conference presents
particularly interesting problems because courts have not faced this
issue before, 10 and there exists an inherent conflict of interest when
a conference is able to sanction one of its member institutions.1 '
This Note first details the facts that gave rise to the players'
claims against the member conference. 12 Second, this Note surveys
pertinent federal antitrust and state contract law, with specific refer-
ence to litigation involving the NCAA and intercollegiate athlet-
ics.1 3 Third, this Note describes how the court arrived at its
decision to affirm the dismissal of the players' antitrust and breach
5. See generally NCAA Bylaw art. 32, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 455
(1994) (setting forth NCAA's "Enforcement Policies and Procedures"). For a dis-
cussion of member conferences' shared power with the NCAA to regulate and
sanction its member institutions, see infra notes 19-20, 28, 31-32 and accompanying
text.
6. See generally Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70
TUL. L. REv. 2631 (1996) (discussing antitrust litigation involving NCAA); Heller,
supra note 1, at 315-17 (discussing potential antitrust and breach of contract argu-
ments against NCAA).
7. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
8. See id. at 1318-20.
9. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (providing that horizon-
tal restraints of trade imposed by NCAA were not per se antitrust violations, but
instead warranted special treatment under antitrust rule of reason analysis). For a
complete discussion of the NCAA v. Board of Regents decision, see infra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the novelty of the challenge to member conference-
imposed sanctions, see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the inherent conflict of interest when a member con-
ference sanctions a member institution, see infra notes 28-29, 31-32, 140 and ac-
companying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts in Hairston, see infta notes 17-35 and accom-
panying text.
13. For a discussion of pertinent legal background of Hairston, see infra notes
36-77 and accompanying text.
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of contract claims. 14 Fourth, this Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and examines the propriety of the court's treatment of
the pertinent legal tests in light of the evidence presented by the
players.1 5 Finally, this Note discusses the impact of Hairston on the
ability of the NCAA and its member conferences to regulate and
sanction their member institutions, as well as the effect of the
court's decision on players who believe that the NCAA or their
member conference has unfairly sanctioned their institution's ath-
letic program.1 6
II. FAcrs
The University of Washington (UW) 17 is one of the ten institu-
tions that comprise the Pacific 10 Conference (Pac-10), 1 8 which is a
"member conference" of the NCAA.19 Under the NCAA's system of
enforcement, the NCAA and the Pac-10, as a member conference,
concurrently wield the power to regulate and sanction Pac-10 mem-
ber institution's NCAA rules violations. 20
14. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Hairston, see infra notes
78-112 and accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hairston, see infra notes
113-32 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hairston,
see infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
17. See In Perspective (visited Sept. 19, 1997) <http://www.washington.edu/
home/profile/perspective.html>. UW is a public research university located in Se-
attle and attended by approximately 35,000 students. See id. UW has a prominent
athletic department, with 23 intercollegiate athletic programs spanning both
men's and women's sports. See University of Washington - Digital Dawghouse (visited
Sept. 19, 1997) <http://www. washington.edu/huskysports/>. UW's mascot is the
Husky, and accordingly, UW is sometimes referred to as "the Huskies." See id.
18. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1317 n.1 (9th Cir.
1996). The ten universities that comprise the Pac-10 are: (1) UW; (2) Washington
State University; (3) the University of Oregon; (4) Oregon State University; (5) the
University of California, Berkeley; (6) Stanford University; (7) the University of
California, Los Angeles; (8) the University of Southern California; (9) Arizona
State University; and (10) the University of Arizona. See id.
The Pac-10 is a voluntary private regional association of ten universities from
the western United States whose purpose is "to establish an athletic program, ad-
minister intercollegiate athletic events, and stage conference tournaments." See
Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1489 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(Hairston 1).
19. See NCAA Bylaws art. 3.02.3.3, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 8 (1994).
The NCAA defines a "member conference" as, "a group of college and/or universi-
ties that conducts competition among its members and determines a conference
champion in one or more sports, duly elected to conference membership under
the provisions of this article." Id. (parentheticals omitted).
20. See Hairston I, 893 F. Supp. at 1489. Under the NCAA's enforcement sys-
tem, "[b]oth the Pac-10 and the NCAA promulgate and enforce rules governing
the conduct of their members' athletic programs." Id. at 1489. The UW Mission
Statement provides, "the [c]onduct of [UW's athletic department's] staff, coaches
1998]
3
Gold: College Football Players Can't Tackle Athletic onference's Tough
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
368 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENTr. LAW JOURNAL
Prior to the fall of 1992, the UW athletic program had a
"clean" reputation based on its well-established history of compli-
ance with NCAA regulations.21 On November 5, 1992, the Seattle
Times called into question UW's "clean" reputation in a report dis-
closing that UW's star quarterback, BillyJoe Hobert, had received a
large, unsecured loan from an Idaho businessman.2 2 While stu-
dent-athletes are not completely forbidden from accepting loans
under all circumstances, the NCAA greatly restricts the terms and
conditions under which student-athletes can receive these types of
"benefits."23 Following the Seattle Times' report, UTW and the Pac-10
and student athletes shall remain within the spirit and intent of all applicable rules(NCAA, Pacific-10 and University of Washington), with special emphasis on hon-
esty and upholding a high sense of character." Mission Statement (visited Sept. 19,
1997) <http://www.washington.edu/huskysports/athletics/missionstate.html>.
For a discussion of the NCAA's "purposes," including its legislative function,
see supra note 2. According to the NCAA Constitution, a "member conference" is
"a legislative body on the conference level." NCAA Const. art. 3.3.2.2.1, reprinted in
1994-95 NCAA Manual 13 (1994). The NCAA Constitution defines "legislative
body" as "an athletics conference that develops and maintains rules and regula-
tions governing the athletics programs and activity of its member institutions."
NCAA Const. art. 3.02.2, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 7 (1994). The mem-
ber conferences will often handle local or regional problems, while the NCAA fo-
cuses mainly on the interregional and inter-conference issues in intercollegiate
athletics. See NCAA Online: About the NCAA (visited Sept. 19, 1997) <http://
www.ncaa.org/about/>.
21. See Danny Robbins & Elliott Almond, Washington: A Program Gone Awry?
Athletics: Interviews, Court and State Records Show That Some Football Players Received
Cash, Jobs for Little or No Work, Use of Truck, Free Lodging, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at
Cl. Prior to 1992, UW had not been sanctioned for major NCAA rules violations
since 1955. See id.
22. See Tom Farrey & Eric Nalder, Huskies' Hobert Got $50,000 Loan: Money
From Businessman Spent in Spree; May Violate NCAA Rules, Lead to Sanctions, SEATTLE
TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1992, at Al. The Seattle Times'story stated that there were "unusual
conditions" surrounding Hobert's receipt of the loan, including most notably, that
it had "no specific payback schedule" and it "was made even though Hobert had
no assets to guarantee its repayment." Id. Other questionable aspects of the loan
included its sheer size ($50,000) and Hobert's status as a leading professional foot-
ball prospect. See id.
23. See generally NCAA Bylaws art. 16.12, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual
222 (1994) (providing rules pertaining to "Benefits, Gifts and Services" to student-
athletes). The NCAA's general rule regarding benefits, gifts and services reads,
"[r] eceipt of a benefit by student-athletes, their relatives or friends is not a viola-
tion of NCAA rules if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is generally available
to the institution's students and their relatives or friends." NCAA Bylaws art.
16.12.1.1, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 222 (1994) (parenthetical omitted).
Under what is known as the "extra benefit" rule, "[t]he student-athlete shall not
receive any extra benefit. The term 'extra benefit' refers to any special arrange-
ment by an institutional employee or representative of the institution's athletics
interests to provide the student-athlete or his or her relatives or friends with a
benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation." NCAA Bylaws art.
16.12.2.1, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 223 (1994). The NCAA includes "[a]
loan of money" in its non-exhaustive list of extra benefits prohibited by this rule.
See NCAA Bylaws art. 16.12.2.3(a), reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 223 (1994).
[Vol. 5: p. 365
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conducted an investigation into the loan.2 4 This investigation ulti-
mately revealed that the loan violated NCAA regulations, which cost
Hobert his collegiate eligibility.25
Although neither the NCAA nor the Pac-10 initially sanctioned
UW for the Hobert loan, the incident triggered immediate and in-
tense scrutiny of UW's athletic department, particularly its football
program. 26 In December of 1992, a Los Angeles Times' probe into
the UTW athletic program resulted in the publication of numerous
allegations of previously undetected NCAA rules violations by the
UW football program.27 Spawned by the Los Angeles Times' report,
the Pac-10 launched its own investigation into UW's football pro-
gram. 28 On June 25, 1993, this investigation culminated in the Pac-
10's filing of a "Notice of Charges," citing a wide range of NCAA
In 1994, the NCAA enacted a regulation specifically dealing with loans which
reads,
[a] student-athlete may receive a loan on a deferred pay-back basis with-
out jeopardizing his or her eligibility, provided: (a) [t]he loan arrange-
ments are not contrary to the extra-benefit rule, and (b) [t]he student-
athlete's athletics reputation, skill or pay-back potential as a future profes-
sional athlete is not considered by the lending agency in its decision to
provide the loan.
NCAA Bylaws art. 16.12.1.2, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 222 (1994).
24. See Tom Farrey, UW Rules Hobert Ineligible: Pac-lO Will Decide Whether Games
Must Be Forfeited, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 1992, at Al.
25. See id. Specifically, UJW determined that Hobert's loan violated the
NCAA's extra benefit rule governing deferred pay-back loans. See id.
26. See College Watch: Illegal Motion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at B6. Both the
Pac-10 and the Los Angeles Times launched investigations of possible NCAA viola-
tions by the UW football program. See id.
27. See Robbins & Almond, supra note 21, at Cl. The Los Angeles Times report
alleged the following violations by the UTW football program: (1) players receiving
large sums of money from boosters; (2) boosters arranging summer jobs where
players were paid for little or no work; (3) boosters providing players with use of
vehicles; and (4) boosters and assistant coaches arranging for free lodging for a
player. See id. This report was significant because formal investigations of member
institutions' athletic programs are frequently launched in response to media re-
ports of alleged NCAA rules violations. See Heller, supra note 1, at 301-02.
According to NCAA Bylaws, a member institution's responsibility for the con-
duct of its athletics program includes responsibility for the acts of its "boosters."
See NCAA Bylaws art. 6.4.2, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 47 (1994). Specifi-
cally, this responsibility attaches if "a member of the institution's executive or ath-
letics administration has knowledge or should have knowledge that such an
individual... has assisted or is assisting in providing benefits to enrolled student-
athletes .... " Id. at art. 6.4.2(d). Therefore, although not committed by an insti-
tution official, improper booster conduct can result in violations of NCAA rules
and corresponding sanctions. See id.
28. See Robbins & Almond, supra note 21, at Cl. Here, the Pac-10, as opposed
to the NCAA, conducted the investigation because it has a reputation as a confer-
ence that controlled its member institutions. See id.
1998] 369
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rules violations by the UW football program. 29 After filing the No-
tice of Charges, the Pac-10 Council, which is composed of repre-
sentatives from the ten Pac-10 universities, 30 officially sanctioned
UW for its NCAA rules violations.3 1
29. See Danny Robbins & Elliot Almond, Huskies' Boosters Accused by Pac-lO In-
vestigation: Dozens of Alleged Violations Are Listed in 38-Page Report, Including Summer
No-Work Jobs for Athletes, L.A. TIMEs, June 26, 1993, at Cl. According to the NCAA
Bylaws, the NCAA or the member conference must provide the member institu-
tion under investigation a "Notice of Charges" for major violations. See NCAA By-
laws art. 19.5.1, reprinted in 1994-95 NCAA Manual 340 (1994). The notice must
contain: "[a] [n]otice of any specific charges against it and the facts upon which
such charges are based . . . ." Id. Additionally, the notice grants the member
institution "[a] n opportunity to appear before the Committee on Infractions [or
the corresponding member conference body] to answer such charges by the pro-
duction of evidence." Id. (parentheticals omitted).
The Los Angeles Times reported that, in its Notice of Charges, the Pac-10
charged UW with numerous violations of NCAA rules over an eight-year period.
See Robbins & Almond, supra, at Cl. In addition to the improper booster activities,
the Notice of Charges contained allegations concerning the Hobert loan, an alle-
gation of recruitment misconduct by the head football coach's son-in-law and a
general charge that "[t]he school showed a lack of institutional control in the man-
ner in which it accounted for expenses for football recruits' official campus visits
.
Id.
30. See Robbins & Almond, supra note 29, at Cl (explaining that Pac-10 Coun-
cil is composed of athletic program officials and faculty representatives from the
ten conference schools).
31. See Elliot Almond, Washington Huskies Get Tough Pac 10 Penalties, Sports:
Football Coach Resigns After Conference Imposes Sanctions for Violations of NCAA Rules,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Almond, Washington Huskies Get
Tough]. The Pac-10 Council found the following six major NCAA rules violations:
(1) UW student athletes were improperly employed during summers and holidays;
(2) UW quarterback, Billy Joe Hobert's improper acceptance of the large, un-
secured loan; (3) UW boosters provided UW football players with free meals and
excessive wages; (4) U3W boosters offered recruiting inducements illegally to pro-
spective UW student athletes; (5) UW boosters illegally made recruiting contacts
with prospective UW student athletes; and (6) UW hosts improperly used meal
expenses on prospective student athletes on official recruiting visits. See id.
As a result of these findings, the Pac-10 Council levied the following sanctions
on UW: (1) a two-year bowl ban; (2) a one-year television revenue ban; (3) a two-
year limit on scholarships; (4) a two-year reduction of recruiting visits; and (5) a
two-year probationary period. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d
1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996). The television ban was projected to cost UW $1.4
million in lost revenue. See id.
The Pac-10's sanctioning process begins with a hearing held by the Pac-10
Compliance and Enforcement Committee. See Almond, Washington Huskies Get
Tough, supra, at Al. This body then submits a recommendation to the Pac-10
Council for possible sanctions. See id. Next, the Pac-10 Council hands down the
sanctions based on the Compliance and Enforcement Committee's recommenda-
tion. See id. The Pac-10's Chief Executive Officers then must ratify the Pac-10
Council's sanctions. See id. Finally, the NCAA reviews the conference-imposed
sanctions and may increase, but cannot reduce the member conference's sanc-
tions. See id. It has been shown that the NCAA rarely amends conference-imposed
sanctions. See id.
In what was characterized as "a surprising move," The Los Angeles Times re-
ported that the Pac-10 Council, which is comprised of officials from the Pac-10
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The severity of the Pac-10 imposed sanctions triggered immedi-
ate outcries of unfairness and impropriety from the UW sports com-
munity.3 2 Devastated by the impact of these sanctions, a disparate
group of football supporters and football players from UW, though
not representing UTW, brought a lawsuit in federal district court
against the Pac-10 seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief
under a variety of legal theories. 33 In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Confer-
ence, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
member institutions, considered too lenient the sanctions recommended by the
Pac-10 Compliance and Enforcement Committee. See Elliot Almond, A Storm Seat-
tle Won't Forget: First the Sanctions Then Don James Quits, It Was a Tough Day in Wash-
ington, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Almond, A Storm].
Consequently, the Pac-10 Council enhanced the sanctions and targeted them
more specifically toward the UW football program. See id. The Los Angeles Times'
response to these sanctions was that "[t]he penalties [imposed on UW by the Pac-
10 were] some of the stiffest evergiven by the conference and serve as the final chapter in
an eight-month ordeal in which allegations of NCAA rules violations surfaced from
newspaper reports." See Almond, Washington Huskies Get Tough, supra, at Al (em-
phasis added).
32. See Almond, Washington Huskies Get Tough, supra note 31, at Al; Steve
Springer, Crying Foul: Hobert Says the Pac-JO Treated Huskies Unfairly, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
24, 1993, at C1. UW Athletic Director, Barbara Hedges stated, "[w]e believe the
penalties are too harsh and unwarranted in this case ... [the sanctions set a stan-
dard that is] almost unheard of in the NCAA." See Almond, Washington Huskies Get
Tough, supra note 31, at Al. Athletic Director Hedges also expressed disbelief over
the severity of the sanctions in relation to penalties imposed on other violating
schools. See id.
In addition, in the wake of these sanctions, long-time head football coach Don
James resigned, explaining, "I have decided I can no longer coach in a conference
that treats its players and coaches so unfairly ... [b]y looking at the penalties, it
appears we are all guilty, based in large part upon statements of questionable wit-
nesses." Id. A UW football player also added, "I think penalties we have to live by
now are far too severe for the things that were wrong ... [t]he wrongdoings were
minor in a lot of people's eyes and don't compare to a lot of other institutions."
Id.
Primary culprit, Billy Joe Hobert, was also outwardly critical of the severity of
UW's sanctions and the process that the Pac-10 used to determine these sanctions:
I read in the paper that the Pac-10 is the only league that institutes its
own charges on cases like this .... I think it was totally biased. I think the
Pac-10 is sick and tired of the University of Washington kicking their hind
end every time we play them in a game. They should have had some
other unbiased institution come in, maybe somebody from the Big Ten
or the Big Sky .... I don't think the penalties levied fit the crime ....
The NCAA isn't that tough. Thatjust blows me away. I can't believe it.
Springer, supra.
33. See Hairston I, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1488-89 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The origi-
nal parties to this suit were five football players, a football season ticket holder and
two UW souvenir sellers who had licensing agreements with UW. See id. The origi-
nal suit brought by these parties included: (1) federal antitrust claims under the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 and 16; (2) claims under the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020 and 19.86.030; (3) a third party beneficiary
breach of contract claim; (4) a claim of tortious interference with a business expec-
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plaintiffs' 3 4 claims on the grounds that: (1) they failed to show anti-
trust injury; and (2) they did not qualify as third-party beneficiaries
of a contract between UW and the Pac-10.3 5
III. BACKGROUND
In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, the players appealed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of their federal antitrust claim and their third-
party beneficiary breach of contract claim. 36 This section first dis-
cusses the general principles of these legal theories, and then ex-




The federal government's regulation of trusts formally began
in 1890, when Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sher-
man Act) with the purpose of promoting a competitive economy by
restricting anticompetitive business practices.3 8 Twenty-four years
34. See Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996). On appeal, the plaintiffs were
the five UW football players, as they were the only parties to appeal the district
court's dismissal. See id.
35. See id. In Hairston I, the district court granted the Pac-1O's 12(b) (6) mo-
tion to dismiss for all the plaintiffs' claims, with the exception of the football play-
ers' federal and state antitrust claims. See Hairston I, 893 F. Supp. at 1485. The
district court later granted the Pac-10's motion for summaryjudgment for the re-
maining claims. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1495 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (Hairston II). The Hairston case is the football players' appeal of the
district court's grant of summary judgment against their antitrust claims in Hair-
ston II and the district court's dismissal of their breach of contract claim for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in Hairston I. See Hairston, 101
F.3d at 1317-18.
36. See Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315. For a discussion of the players' claims against
the Pac-10, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the background of federal antitrust law, see infra notes
38-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the background of the third-
party beneficiary breach of contract theory, see infra notes 59-60 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the application of these legal theories in the intercol-
legiate athletics context, see infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
38. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988)). Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part, "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States... is hereby declared to be illegal." Id.
In Northern Pacic Railway v. United States, Justice Black explained the purpose
of the Sherman Act:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
[Vol. 5: p. 365
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later, Congress passed the Clayton Act, which established a private
cause of action for damages and injunctive relief for plaintiffs who
are able to prove violations of the federal antitrust laws under the
Sherman Act.39
In order to more uniformly decide antitrust claims brought
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, federal courts have devel-
oped a series of common law tests based on the interpreted legisla-
tive intent and the plain language of these Acts. 40 As a result,
plaintiffs bringing antitrust suits must meet two threshold require-
ments: (1) they must show that the defendant caused them antitrust
injury; and (2) they must demonstrate standing to bring the anti-
trust claim.4 1
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.
356 U.S. 1,4-5 (1958) (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)).
39. See ABA SEcrION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, ch.
X(A) (4th ed. 1997). Section 15 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of
action for monetary damages, as it reads in pertinent part, "any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor[e] ...... 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 26
(providing private right of action for injunctive relief in antitrust actions).
40. For a discussion of the common law developments in the area of antitrust
law, see infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. In National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, the Supreme Court explained its interpretation of the
legislative intent of the Sherman Act:
Congress... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the
full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to
give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (citing 21 Cong.Rec. 2456 (1890) (noting comments of
Sen. Sherman)).
41. See generally 2 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
360f, at 202-04 (rev. ed. 1995). Although a court must consider the issue of consti-
tutional standing before a case may proceed, under prevailing antitrust doctrine, a
court may dismiss a case on its merits without even reaching the standing issue. See
id. at 202-03; see also Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (lth
Cir. 1996) (recognizing Areeda and Hovenkamp as authorities in stating "[w] hen a
court concludes that no violation has occurred, it has no occasion to consider
standing"); Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining
there was antitrust injury and therefore not reaching antitrust standing issue). But
see, R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 153 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (holding "[e]stablishment of [antitrust] standing, logically pre-
cedes the presentation of a plaintiffs case.").
1998]
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1. Antitrust Injury Requirement
In Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,4 2 the Ninth Circuit announced
that in order to establish that the defendant caused antitrust injury,
plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy; (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade under
either the per se or the rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the
restraint affected interstate commerce. 43 Of the three, the second
requirement has emerged as the most pivotal of the analysis. 44 This
requirement, that the plaintiff prove the restraint in question was
unreasonable, is not found in the language of the federal antitrust
statutes. 45 Instead, courts have injected this reasonableness require-
ment into the antitrust analysis in order to separate necessary or
beneficial restraints of trade from those that are unnecessary or det-
rimental to trade. 46
When determining whether a restraint of trade is unreasona-
ble, the court will undertake either a per se or a rule of reason
analysis. 47 The per se analysis is used when a defendant's activities
42. 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991). This case involved a federal antitrust claim
brought by a nurse anesthetist against a hospital that permitted only physicians to
administer anesthesia services. See id. at 1408-09. The Ninth Circuit found no anti-
trust violation because the anesthetist failed to meet the threshold requirement of
showing antitrust injury. See id. at 1413-14.
43. See id. at 1410 (citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1987)).
44. See, e.g., id. at 1412-14. In Bhan, the plaintiff fulfilled the first and third
antitrust injury requirements by showing sufficient evidence of a conspiracy, as well
as offering evidence that the restraint affected interstate commerce. See id. at 1413.
Therefore, the court dealt only with the second requirement: whether the practice
of permitting only physicians to administer anesthesia services constituted an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. The court in Bhan ana-
lyzed the hospital's practice under the rule of reason and held that the plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of showing that the hospital's practice resulted in an
unreasonable restraint of trade. See id. at 1412-14.
45. See, e.g., supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (providing text and dis-
cussion of relevant antitrust provisions).
46. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. The Ninth Circuit cited Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States, as the classic formulation of the reasonableness analysis in federal
antitrust law. See id. at 1409 n.3 (citing 246 U.S. 231 (1918)). Justice Brandeis' oft-
cited rationalization for the adoption of the reasonableness standard for antitrust
analysis provides:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by
... whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
47. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1410 (discussing Ninth Circuit's application of per se
and rule of reason analyses in antitrust cases). For a discussion of the rule of rea-
son and per se analyses, see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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have regularly produced anticompetitive effects, 48 while the rule of
reason analysis is used where the per se analysis does not apply.49
The rule of reason analysis requires a balancing of the plaintiffs'
evidence of the restraint's anticompetitive effects against the de-
fendant's showing of the activity's procompetitive effects; the plain-
tiff must then show how the procompetitive effects can be
accomplished in a less restrictive manner. 50 If plaintiffs are unable
to meet their burden at any point of this analysis, the plaintiffs'
antitrust claim will fail.51
2. Antitrust Standing Requirement
The antitrust standing requirement is based on Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, which broadly defines the class of persons who can
48. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). In Northern
Pacific, the Supreme Court noted that courts should apply the per se analysis where
the "agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competi-
tion and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. Here, the Supreme Court
ruled that a vertical agreement between a railroad and a subsidiary was a per se
violation of antitrust law. See id. at 2.
In Bahn, the Ninth Circuit explained that under the per se analysis, "we do not
require evidence of any actual effects on competition because we consider the po-
tential for harm to be so clear and so great." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1410. The court
further emphasized that plaintiffs naturally prefer the per se analysis because "it
greatly simplifies the proof required." Id.
Examples of restraints of trade that courts have held to be per se antitrust
violations include horizontal price fixing, division of markets, certain tying ar-
rangements and some types of boycotts. See id. (citing Hahn v. Oregon Physicians'
Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988)). Additionally, in K.C. Dick Geothermal
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., the Ninth Circuit called into question the dichotomy
between the rule of reason analysis and the per se rule, but noted that the per se
analysis is "applicable where experience has established that anticompetitive conse-
quences regularly follow from the condemned practice." 890 F.2d 139, 151 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 607
(1972)).
49. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1410. The Bhan court explained that under the rule
of reason analysis, the court must analyze "the degree of harm to competition
along with any justifications or procompetitive effects to determine whether the
practice is unreasonable on balance." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1410; see also National
Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that
rule of reason analysis "focuses directly on challenged restraints' impact on com-
petitive conditions."); Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445
(9th Cir. 1988) (noting that in contrast to per se analysis, rule of reason analysis
requires case-by-case study of particular circumstances of case). In Bahn, the Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show that the hospital's policy substantially
restrained competition in the relevant market. See Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413.
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maintain a private antitrust claim.5 2 On its face, Section 4 of the
Clayton Act does not impose a standing requirement, as it places no
express limitations on who can bring an antitrust claim. 53 The
Supreme Court, however, has determined that Congress did not in-
tend to create unlimited federal antitrust standing.54 Instead, the
Supreme Court has decided that Congress meant for the courts to
interpret and narrow the broad language of the Clayton Act.55
As a result, the Supreme Court has developed requirements
that antitrust plaintiffs must satisfy in order to demonstrate stand-
52. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. Section 15 provides, "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor[e] .... " Id. For a detailed discussion of § 4 of the
Clayton Act, see ABA SECrION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS,
ch. X (4th ed. 1997).
53. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 530 (1983). In Associated Genera the Supreme Court
explained, "[a] literal reading of the statute is broad enough to encompass every
harm that can be attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of an anti-
trust violation." Id. at 529.
54. See id. at 529-35. The Supreme Court noted that "Congress did not intend
the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might con-
ceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." Id. at 534 (citing Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972)).
In Associated General, the Supreme Court ruled against a labor union in its
federal antitrust claim against a contractor's association that entered into a bar-
gaining agreement which encouraged union workers to join non-union firms. See
id. at 520-46. The basis of the court's decision was that the plaintiff labor union
failed to prove it had antitrust standing. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 544-46.
In the course of its reasoning, the court thoroughly analyzed the purpose and
legislative intent of § 4 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 529-35. In its decision, the
Supreme Court provided its classic rationale for imposing an antitrust standing
requirement:
An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow
through the Nation's economy; but 'despite the broad wording of § 4
there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.'
It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every
person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an ac-
tion to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or
property.
Id. at 534-35 (quoting Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465
(1982) (citations omitted)); see also Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (con-
cluding that antitrust laws cannot apply to every activity that restrains trade be-
cause restraint of trade is the essence of trade agreements); R.C. Dick Geothermal
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 146 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (explain-
ing that "[Associated General] made clear that § 4 of the Clayton Act is not be read
literally so that 'any person' who was injured 'by reason of anything forbidden by
the antitrust laws' could maintain an action." (citing Associated Genera 459 U.S. at
535)).
55. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978). In National Society, the Supreme Court declared, "[t]he legislative history
makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition." Id.; see also R.C. Dick, 890
F.2d at 146 (applying Supreme Court's interpretation of § 4 of Clayton Act).
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ing to bring an antitrust action under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 56 Accordingly, in order to demonstrate antitrust standing,
plaintiffs must show first, that they suffered antitrust injury,5 7 and
second, that they are the proper plaintiffs to bring the antitrust
action.58
B. Breach of Contract Background
Under general principles of contract law, plaintiffs who are not
parties to a contract can successfully bring a claim for breach of
contract against a party to that contract if the plaintiffs can show
that they are third-party beneficiaries of the contract.59 In the State
of Washington, in order for plaintiffs to prove that they are third-
56. For a discussion of the common law test for antitrust standing under § 4
of the Clayton Act, see infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. See Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). The
first requirement imposes a burden on antitrust plaintiffs to show that their injury
and the defendant's activities were within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. See
id. at 109. In Cargill, the Supreme Court explained that under the first
requirement:
plaintiffs seeking treble damages under § 4 must show more than simply
an 'injury causally linked' to a particular merger; instead, 'plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the de-
fendants' acts unlawful.'
Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977)).
58. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 n.5. The second prong of the standing analysis
requires antitrust plaintiffs to show that they are the appropriate plaintiffs to main-
tain the antitrust claim against the defendant. See id. Federal courts have devel-
oped a variety of criteria to determine whether a plaintiff meets this requirement.
See Associated Genera4 459 U.S. at 534-42 (1983). In Associated General, the Supreme
Court provided two criteria for determining whether a plaintiff is a proper anti-
trust plaintiff. See id. The first criterion considered by the court was whether a
private attorney general could more effectively combat the defendant's trust
through its function under the Clayton Act. See id. at 542; see also Eagle v. Star-Kist
Foods, Inc., 812 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing Supreme Court's first
criterion for determining whether plaintiff is appropriate antitrust plaintiff). Sec-
ond, the Court considered the causal connection between the defendant's activi-
ties and the plaintiffs injuries. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 534 (citation
omitted).
In addition, some circuits have adopted their own criteria for determining
whether a plaintiff is a proper antitrust plaintiff. See, e.g., K.C. Dick, 890 F.2d at 146
(citing Associated General, 459 U.S. at 537-45) (noting that Ninth Circuit considers
the following criteria relevant: (1) the specific intent of the defendants; (2) the
directness of the injury; (3) the nature of the damages, including the risk of dupli-
cative recovery; (4) the existence of other, more appropriate plaintiffs; and (5) the
nature of the plaintiff's claimed injury).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). The Restatement
states:
Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a benefici-
ary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
19981
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party beneficiaries, they must show that in light of the circum-
stances surrounding the contract, the parties to the contract objec-
tively intended for the contract to directly benefit the plaintiffs. 60
C. Intercollegiate Athletics and the Law
Recently, disputes within intercollegiate athletics have become
ripe subjects for litigation. 61 Parties challenging NCAA regulations
and rulings have frequently based their claims on federal antitrust
law and on principles of contract law. 62 This section discusses the
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to five the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended
beneficiary.
Id. For common law origins and development of third party beneficiary theory of
contract law, see generally Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (recognizing for
first time right of third party to sue on contract); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233
(1918) (recognizing right of third-party beneficiary where there is pecuniary obli-
gation running from promisee to beneficiary); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160 (1928) (discussing limits of third-party beneficiary claims in con-
text of public service contracts).
60. See Postlewait Constr., Inc. v. Great American Ins. Cos., 720 P.2d 805, 806
(Wash. 1986) (citing Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1983)).
Postlewait involved an action brought by a lessor of cranes directly against a lessee's
insurance company seeking payment for damages to their cranes caused by the
insured lessee. See id. at 805-06. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a
motion for summary judgement by the insurance company on the grounds that
the lessor failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of the insurance
policy between the lessee and the insurance company. See id. at 806-07. The
Supreme Court of Washington explained the test for third-party beneficiaries as
follows:
[B]oth contracting parties must intend that a third party beneficiary con-
tract be created. Furthermore, the test of intent is an objective one; the
key is not whether the contracting parties had an altruistic motive or de-
sire to benefit the third party, but rather, 'whether performance under
the contract would necessarily and directly benefit' that party. The con-
tracting parties' intent is determined by construing the terms of the con-
tract as a whole, in light of the circumstances under which it is made.
Id. at 806-09 (citing Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1983); Grand
Lodge of Scandinavian Fraternity of Am., Dist. 7 v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 98 P.2d 971 (Wash. 1940)).
61. See generally, Heller, supra note 1, at 312-18 (discussing recent lawsuits
challenging NCAA regulations and enforcement process).
62. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (challenging
NCAA television plan under Sherman Act). Other plaintiffs have brought consti-
tutional-based claims against the NCAA. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988) (dismissing college basketball coach's Civil Rights Act challenge to NCAA
sanctions because NCAA was not state actor); NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding Nevada state law which imposes due process requirements on
NCAA violates Commerce Clause of Constitution). For further discussion of con-
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application of these legal theories in recent lawsuits involving inter-
collegiate athletics. 63
1. Federal Antitrust Arguments
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,64 sev-
eral member institutions sued the NCAA alleging that a television
plan proposed by the NCAA violated federal antitrust laws.65 In this
leading federal antitrust law decision, the Supreme Court used the
rule of reason analysis to strike down the NCAA's television plan,
even though the plan constituted a horizontal restraint of trade
which normally triggers the per se antitrust analysis. 66 The NCAA
stitutional-based challenges to NCAA regulations and rulings, see generally Heller,
supra note 1, at 312-14; Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics:
Time for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REv. 487 (1995); Latour Rey Lafferty, The
NCAA 's Unbridled Enforcement Power, and the Validity of Florida's Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act, 68 FLA. B.J. 104 (1994); Wendell Cruz,
Due Process: A Nevada State Statute Attempting To Regulate the Investigations by the NCAA
Regarding Association Infractions is Unconstitutional, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 675
(1993); Kenneth E. James, Collegiate Sports and NCAA Enforcement Procedures: Does the
NCAA Play Fairly? NCAA v. Miller, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 429 (1993); Sherry Young, Is
"Due Process" Unconstitutional? The NCAA Wins Round One in its Fight Against Regula-
tion of its Enforcement Proceedings, 25 AiZ. ST. L.J. 841 (1993); Robin J. Green, Does
the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE
L.J. 99 (1992).
63. For a discussion of the application of federal antitrust and contract law in
claims involving intercollegiate athletics, see infra notes 64-77 and accompanying
text.
64. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
65. See id. The NGAA's television plan limited the total number of televised
games, restricted the number of games each member institution could have tele-
vised and prohibited member institutions from individually selling television rights
to its games. See id. at 91-94. According to the NCAA, the purpose of the plan was
"to reduce the adverse effect of live television upon football game attendance." Id.
at 92 n.6.
66. See id. at 86-88, 99-104. For a discussion of the per se rule, see supra notes
49-51 and accompanying text. The Board of Regents Court began by explaining that
the NCAA television plan was horizontal restraint on trade, which the court de-
fined as "an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete
with one another." Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99. The Court then discussed how
horizontal restraints of trade normally warrant the per se antitrust analysis, stating
"[h]orizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a
matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because the probability that these
practices are anticompetitive is so high. .. ." Id. at 100. Here, however, the Court
used the rule of reason analysis to determine whether the plan was an antitrust
violation. See id. at 100-01. The Court held definitively that even under the rule of
reason analysis, the NCAA's television plan violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
stating:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it
needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to inter-
collegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sher-
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clearly "lost the battle" because the Court invalidated its television
plan;67 the NCAA appears to have "won the war," however, as this
case established a precedent of applying the more lenient rule of
reason analysis in determining whether NCAA-imposed restraints of
trade violate federal antitrust law.68
As a result of the Board of Regents decision, antitrust claims
against the NCAA have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful. 69 For
man Act. But consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA
must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict
output are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold only that the
record supports the District Court's conclusion that by curtailing output
and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer
preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. For a discussion of the impact of the Board of
Regents decision on antitrust regulation of intercollegiate athletics, see D. Kent
Meyers & Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Works Occasionally:
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, A Case in Point, 48 OKIA.
L. REv. 669 (1995).
67. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
68. See id. at 101-03. The court's rationale for using the rule of reason analysis
was that, "[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic
teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in inter-
collegiate athletics." Id. at 117. In an oft-quoted statement, the court expounded
on this rationale by providing a complete explanation of why horizontal restraints
are essential in the regulation of intercollegiate athletics, and therefore, scruti-
nized under the less restrictive rule of reason analysis. See id. at 101-02. The court
wrote:
[w]hat the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is com-
petition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of course, this
would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the com-
petitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed...
[m]oreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-
college football. The identification of this 'product' with an academic
tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular
than professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such
as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the charac-
ter and quality of the 'product,' athletes must not be paid, must be re-
quired to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the 'product'
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution
adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on
the playing field might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital
role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.
In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only the
choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes-and
hence can be viewed as procompetitive.
Id. The court then went on to adopt the rule of reason analysis in this case because
it reasoned that in the industry of intercollegiate athletics, "horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id. at 101.
69. See generally Heller, supra note 1, at 315-16 (discussing courts' use of rule
of reason analysis to dismiss parties' antitrust claims against NCAA); Roberts, supra
note 6, at 2631 (criticizing courts' application of antitrust law to dismiss antitrust
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example, courts have recently invoked the rule of reason analysis in
upholding NCAA eligibility standards against antitrust attacks by
student-athletes. 70 Moreover, courts have also consistently rejected
antitrust challenges to NCAA-imposed sanctions, as a result of the
use of the more permissive rule of reason analysis. 71
2. Contract Law Arguments
In addition to antitrust claims, plaintiffs have occasionally chal-
lenged the validity of NCAA regulations and rulings under contract
law theories.72 For instance, in Trustees of the State Colleges and Uni-
versities v. NCAA, 73 the Court of Appeals of California enjoined the
NCAA from enforcing sanctions against a member institution that
allegedly permitted ineligible players to participate in various ath-
letic events.7 4 The court granted the injunction because it held
that the member institution demonstrated the applicability of the
claims against NCAA and calling for legislative intervention to standardize applica-
tion of antitrust law in intercollegiate athletics).
70. See, e.g., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (dismissing
student-athlete's challenge to NCAA eligibility rules by concluding rules were not
subject to antitrust analysis); Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(dismissing student-athlete's challenge to NCAA eligibility rules by holding rules
did not violate federal antitrust law). For further analysis of cases involving anti-
trust challenges to NCAA eligibility rules, see Thomas R. Kobin, The National Col-
legiate Athletic Association's No Agent and No Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate Sports
are Forcing Change, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 483 (1994); Paul B. McCarthy &
Michael Kettle, An End Run Around the Sherman Act? Banks v. NCAA and Gaines v.
NCAA, 19J.C. & U.L. 295 (1993).
71. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying
rule of reason analysis in dismissing Southern Methodist University student-ath-
letes' antitrust suit against NCAA); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.
1983) (applying rule of reason analysis in dismissing University of Arizona student-
athletes' antitrust challenge to NCAA-imposed sanctions).
In contrast, professional athletes have successfully invoked antitrust law in
challenging actions by their sport's governing body. See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies
Prof'l Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding suspension of pro-
fessional golfer by LPGA's Executive Board composed of plaintiff's competitors
violated federal antitrust law).
72. See generally Heller, supra note 1, at 316-18 (discussing challenges to NCAA
sanctions under contract theories).
73. 147 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
74. See id. The member institution, California State University Hayward
(CSUH), was confused by the NCAA's "1.6 Rule" which forbade first year student-
athletes (freshmen) from participating in athletic events if their grade point aver-
age (GPA) was below 1.6. See id. at 189-90. CSUH was unsure whether this rule
applied to all athletic events, or just to post-season events. See id. As a result,
CSUH requested and received an interpretation of the rule from the NCAA, which
affirmed CSUH's reading that it only applied to post-season athletic events. See id.
at 190. The NCAA subsequently released an "Official Interpretation" which pro-
vided that the 1.6 Rule applied to all athletic events. See id. at 190. CSUH, una-
ware of the NCAA's rendering of its Official Interpretation, relied on the prior
interpretation it received from the NCAA and permitted student athletes with
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doctrine of equitable estoppel, which permits the court to enforce
otherwise unenforceable contracts. 75
Although use of this doctrine proved successful in Trustees of
State Colleges, plaintiffs have infrequently had the opportunity to in-
voke the equitable estoppel doctrine because the NCAA is ordina-
rily very cautious and thorough in issuing interpretations of its
regulations. 76 Future plaintiffs, however, may continue to attempt
creative uses of contract law to attack the validity of NCAA regula-
tions and rulings.77
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYsIS
In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
the district court's dismissal of the players' federal antitrust and
breach of contract claims against the Pac-10. 78 The court first con-
sidered the district court's grant of summary judgment against the
players for their federal antitrust claim. 79 Second, the court ad-
dressed the district court's dismissal of the players' breach of con-
tract claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.80 In addition, the concurring opinion added a supple-
mental analysis of the players' standing to bring their federal anti-
trust claim.8 1
GPAs under 1.6 to play in non-post-season games. See id. at 190-91. The NCAA
then sanctioned CSUH for violating the 1.6 Rule. See id. at 191.
75. See id. at 193. The court explained that in order to invoke the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, the party seeking estoppel must show: (1) the opposing party
was aware of the relevant facts; (2) the opposing party's actions were either in-
tended to induce him to act, or he had a right to believe the opposing party had
this intention; (3) the party seeking estoppel was ignorant of the true facts; and (4)
he detrimentally relied on this action. See id. at 193. The court addressed each of
these elements and concluded that the doctrine applied because when it permit-
ted the ineligible players to play, CSUH reasonably relied on the NCAA's interpre-
tation of the eligibility rules. See id. at 195. Therefore, the NCAA was estopped
from enforcing its subsequent Official Interpetation of the 1.6 Rule against CSUH.
See id.
76. See Heller, supra note 1, at 317 (noting that "[t]he NCAA has apparently
been more careful in the administration and application of its rules in recent
years, as this avenue of relief is seldom utilized for NCAA sanctions.").
77. See, e.g., id. at 317 (citing MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Nov. 11, 1995, at 2C; For
the Record, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1995, at IC) (discussing recent New Mexico case
where NCAA was enjoined from declaring University of New Mexico basketball
player ineligible because NCAA failed to provide adequate interpretation of fresh-
man eligibility rules).
78. See Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315, 1315-20 (9th Cir. 1996).
79. See id. at 1318-20.
80. See id. at 1320.
81. See id. at 1320-23.
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A. Players' Federal Antitrust Claim
The Ninth Circuit began by addressing the players' appeal of
the district court's grant of summary judgment against them on
their federal antitrust claim.8 2 Specifically, the players asserted that
the Pac-10 violated federal antitrust law by imposing sanctions on
UW that were "grossly disproportionate to the University's viola-
tions."8 3 The players characterized the imposition of these "dispro-
portionate" sanctions as a conspiracy by UW's Pac-10 competitors to
cripple the extremely successful UW football program, thereby re-
ducing competition within the Pac-10 and improving the other
teams' chances of success.8 4
The Pac-10 submitted that the appellate court should uphold
summary judgment on this issue because the players lacked the req-
uisite antitrust standing.8 5 Although the district court dismissed the
players' antitrust claim on this basis,8 6 the Ninth Circuit found this
reasoning unpersuasive, but affirmed the district court's dismissal
on alternative grounds.8 7
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment against the players' antitrust claim because it found
that they failed to demonstrate that the Pac-10 caused them anti-
trust injury.88 In reaching this decision, the majority relied on the
82. See id. at 1317-19. The players originally sought both monetary damages,
under § 4 of the Clayton Act, and injunctive relief, under § 16 of the Clayton Act,
for the Pac-10's alleged antitrust violation. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1317. The
court, however, only heard the players' claim for damages (under § 4 of the Clay-
ton Act) because it determined injunctive relief would serve no purpose at the
time this appeal was heard because UW's penalty period had already expired. See
id. at 1317 n.2. The players appealed seeking monetary damages from the Pac-10-
imposed sanctions in the form of the travelling and room and board expenses lost
by virtue of the bowl ban. See id. at 1317.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1317.
85. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1317-18. Since the players' federal antitrust claim
for injunctive relief was not at issue, the Pac-10's argument that the players lacked
antitrust standing was based exclusively on Section 4 of the Clayton Act. See id.
86. See id. at 1318 (citing Hairston II, 893 F. Supp. 1495, 1496 (W.D. Wash.
1995)). In Hairston II, the district court granted summary judgment for the Pac-10
because of the players' failure to "come forward with specific facts in support of
their conspiracy allegations once a legitimate reason for defendants' conduct has
been suggested .... [T] his case [is] dismissed for failure to present evidence of an
anticompetitive conspiracy as required to establish a Sherman Act § 1 violation."
Hairston II, 893 F. Supp. at 1496.
87. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318. The court explained, "[a]lthough we are
not persuaded by the reasoning in the district court's opinion [in Hairston II], we
need not decide whether appellants have met the requirements for antitrust stand-
ing, because they have failed to establish any violation of the antitrust laws." Id.
(citation omitted).
88. See id. at 1318.
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theory that the court need not address the standing issue in a fed-
eral antitrust claim when the plaintiffs fail to demonstrate antitrust
injury. 89 The court affirmed the dismissal of the players' antitrust
claim, therefore, not because the players lacked antitrust standing,
but rather based on the merits of the claim.90
The Hairston majority began its analysis of the merits of the
players' antitrust claim by applying the test set forth by the Ninth
Circuit in Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,91 to determine whether a
plaintiff has established a valid antirust claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.92 The Hairston court focused on the second prong of
the Bhan three-prong test which requires an antitrust plaintiff to
prove that the defendant engaged in a restraint of trade that was
unreasonable. 93
In its analysis of the reasonableness of the Pac-10's restraint of
trade, the court relied on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,94 which formed the basis of its use of the rule of reason
analysis instead of the traditional per se analysis. 95 The court deter-
mined that the players met their initial burden under the rule of
reason analysis by showing that the Pac-10's restraint of trade pro-
89. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318. The court relied on the following language
from Areeda and Hovenkamp, "[w]hen a court concludes that no violation has
occurred, it has no occasion to consider [antitrust] standing .... " Id. (quoting 2
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw I 360f, at 202-03 (rev.
ed. 1995)) (footnotes omitted). For other circuits' adoption of this language from
Areeda and Hovenkamp, see, for example, Levine v. Central Florida Med. Affili-
ates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996); Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d
848, 855 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995); McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 845
F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).
90. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318.
91. 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991).
92. See Hairston at 1318-19 (quoting Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1410); for a discussion
of the relevant antitrust prongs from Bhan, see supra notes 42-49 and accompany-
ing text.
93. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. The court determined that the first and
third prongs from Bhan were "not at issue." Id. According to the court, the players
met their burden under prong one because "[t]he Pac-10 members' agreement to
sanction UW fulfills the 'contract, combination, or conspiracy' prong." Id. The
court based this determination on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma where the Supreme Court held that certain horizontal restraints of trade
are necessary in college sports to maintain competitive balance. See Hairston, 101
F.3d at 1319 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99-102 (1984)).
The court also held that the third prong was not at issue because "[t] he parties do
not dispute that the agreement affects interstate commerce." Id. For a discussion
of other cases that have held prongs one and three are not at issue, see, for exam-
ple, Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
95. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99).
The court based its decision to use the rule of reason analysis exclusively on the
reasoning from Board of Regents, without providing any other rationale. See id.
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duced a significant anticompetitive effect.96 The court then held
that the Pac-10 satisfied its burden, as a defendant, under the rule
of reason analysis, by successfully demonstrating the procompetitive
effects of its restraint of trade. 97 The players' federal antitrust claim
ultimately failed because they could not satisfy their final burden
under the rule of reason analysis of showing how the Pac-10 could
achieve the procompetitive effects of its restraint through less re-
strictive means.98
B. Players' Breach of Contract Claim
The players also appealed the district court's dismissal of their
breach of contract claim against the Pac-10.99 The players argued
96. See id. at 1319 (citing Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413). The court determined that
the players' evidence of the sanctions imposed by the Pac-10, specifically the two-
year bowl ban, was enough to meet their initial burden of showing that the Pac-
10's restraint on trade produced a significant anticompetitive consequence. See id.
at 1319.
97. See id. (citing Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413). The court ruled that the Pac-10's
evidence of the "significant procompetitive effects of punishing football programs
that violate the Pac-10's amateurism rules" satisfied their burden as defendants
under the rule of reason. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. The court cited to Board of
Regents as support for the proposition that the regulation of college athletics has
procompetitive effects. See id. (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02). In Board
of Regents, the Supreme Court reasoned that the success of college athletics is due
in large part to amateurism and the requirement that the athletes attend classes.
See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02. Therefore, by creating "mutual agree-
ments" with its member institutions, the NCAA (and therefore the Pac-10) "plays a
vital role" in "preserving the character and quality" of college sports. Id.
98. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. The court pointed out that the players did
not have a significant burden at this point because to overcome a summary judg-
ment motion in the Ninth Circuit, the non-moving party need only provide more
than "a mere scintilla of evidence to support [their] case." Id. (citing City of
Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the Pac-1O's motion for summary judgment because the players
failed to meet their burden under the rule of reason analysis. See id.
The court determined that the plaintiffs did "not offer even the thinnest reed
of support" for their claim that the Pac-10-imposed sanctions were "grossly dispro-
portionate" to UW's violations. Id. at 1319. In fact, the court explained that evi-
dence the players introduced to support their argument actually contradicted their
argument that the Pac-10's sanctions were "grossly disproportionate" to the depart-
ment's violations. See id. First, the players relied on testimony from a UW law
professor familiar with UW's athletic department's case. See id. The professor testi-
fied, however, that after analyzing and comparing the sanctions imposed by the
Pac-10, they were "within range of appropriate penalties." Id. Second, the players
introduced an NCAA report in an attempt to show that the NCAA concluded that
the sanctions were too harsh. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. The court revealed,
however, that the NCAA report actually suggested "that the Pac-10's penalties were
too lenient, not that they were too harsh." Id.
99. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319-20. In Hairston I, the district court dismissed
the players' breach of contract claim on the grounds that,
[tihe only evidence before the court consists of vague, hortatory pro-
nouncements in the contract between the Pac-10 and its member schools.
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that language contained in the Pac-10 Constitution, Bylaws and Ar-
ticles ("Pac-10 Materials") was evidence of the formation of a con-
tract between the Pac-10 and UW, with the players as third-party
beneficiaries. 100 The players submitted that the Pac-10 breached
this contract by imposing disproportionate sanctions on UW which
caused injury to the players as third-party beneficiaries. 10'
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the
players' breach of contract claim on the grounds that the players
failed to establish that they were third-party beneficiaries of the
contract. 10 2 The State of Washington's contract law provides that a
person who is not a party to a contract cannot bring a claim as a
third-party beneficiary, unless, based on the circumstances under
which the contract was made, there is evidence of an objective in-
tent by the parties to the contract to undertake a direct obligation
to the non-contracting party.103 The court concluded that the play-
ers failed to qualify as third-party beneficiaries because, in the opin-
ion of the court, the language the players cited from the Pac-10
Materials was not created with the intent of making them third-
party beneficiaries.' 0 4
By themselves, these pronouncements are not sufficient to support the
players' claims that the Pac-10 intended to assume a direct contractual
obligation to every football player on a Pac-10 team.
Hairston I, 893 F. Supp. at 1494.
100. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319-20. The players relied on language in the
Pac-10 Materials which stated that "the purpose of the Pac-10 is to provide its stu-
dent athletes with 'quality competitive opportunities' and to conduct its affairs so
as to enrich the athletic and academic experience of its student athletes." Hairston
1, 893 F. Supp. at 1494. Specifically, the players alluded to the Pac-10 Constitu-
tion's "Statement of Purpose," which states that the goal of the Pac-10 is "to enrich
and balance the athletic and educational experiences of student-athletes at its
member institutions, [and] to enhance athletic and academic integrity among its
members." Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320.
101. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320.
102. See id. The court provided that "[t]he key here is that [the players] have
not demonstrated that the parties intended to create direct legal obligations be-
tween themselves and the students." Id.
103. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320. The court explained, "[t] he test of intent
is an objective one; the key is not whether the contracting parties had an altruistic
motive or desire to benefit the third party, but rather whether performance under
the contract would necessarily and directly benefit that party." Id. at 1320 (quota-
tion omitted).
104. See id. The court held, "[o]ther than the statements from the Pac-10's
Constitution, By-laws and other legislation, appellants [the players] have failed to
provide any evidence that the parties intended to create a contractual obligation;
accordingly, we find their claim without merit." Id. In reaching this conclusion,
the court referred to the district court's characterization of the players' evidence as
"vague, hortatory pronouncements in the contract" and "not sufficient to support
players' claims that the Pac-lO intended to assume a direct contractual obligation
[Vol. 5: p. 365
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/6
COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYERS CAN'T
C. Concurring Opinion
In the concurring opinion, Judge Trott expressed support for
the majority's holding;10 5 however, Judge Trott also took the oppor-
tunity to reexamine the issue of antitrust standing that was raised at
the district court level, but left unresolved by the majority opinion
of the circuit court.10 6 The concurring opinion was intended to
rectify the district court's erroneous determination that the players
had the requisite standing to bring their antitrust claim.10 7
The concurring opinion began by citing Ninth Circuit prece-
dent which held that standing is the threshold issue plaintiffs must
establish before a court can reach the merits of the claim.108 The
concurring opinion next discussed the Supreme Court cases that
established the antitrust standing requirement under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act.10 9 Judge Trott then applied the test for antitrust
to every football player on a Pac-10 team." Id. (quoting Hairston 1, 893 F. Supp. at
1494).
105. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320 (Trott, J., concurring). Judge Trott ex-
plained, "I concur wholeheartedly in ... [the majority's] excellent analysis of the
merits of the appellants' failed attempt to mount an antitrust case against the
NCAA and the Pac-10." Id.
106. See id. Judge Trott noted, "I write separately, however, to point out that
there is yet another significant reason to affirm the district court's dismissal of this
case: Hairston and his colleagues manifestly lack antitrust standing to bring this
lawsuit, and thus cannot even qualify as valid plaintiffs." Id. The concurring opin-
ion was triggered by "the majority's unexplained statement that they 'are not per-
suaded by the reasoning in the district court's opinion' regarding the antitrust
standing issue." Id. at 1321.
107. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1321 (Trott, J., concurring). Trott's concurring
opinion stated,
By not deciding this threshold issue, I'm concerned that we might en-
courage other potential litigants to limber up their bats to take unwar-
ranted swings at targets legally beyond their reach. My concern is
aroused because we leave intact and on the books the district court's
holding that these plaintiffs do have antitrust standing, a holding which I
respectfully believe is demonstrably erroneous.
Id. at 1320-21 (citing Hairston 1, 893 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). According
to Judge Trott, the intent of the concurring opinion was to "advise . . .potential
[antitrust] litigants [like the players in the instant case] that they do not have
standing to come into court with these kinds of alleged injuries." Id.
108. See id. The concurring opinion relied on another Ninth Circuit case,
RC. Dick, in noting that "[e]stablishment of [antitrust] standing, logically, pre-
cedes the presentation of a plaintiff's case." Id. (quoting R.C. Dick Geothermal v.
Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 152 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). According to
Judge Trott, "[t]he plaintiffs ability to fulfill the requirements of antitrust stand-
ing is an essential threshold element of an antitrust case whereas constitutional
standing is essential to the jurisdiction of the court." Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1321
(Trott, J., concurring) (citing R.C. Dick, 890 F.2d at 145). The concurring opinion
pointed out that RC. Dick analogized antitrust standing to reaching first base
before scoring a run in baseball. See id. at 1321 (Trott, J., concurring).
109. See id. On this issue, Judge Trott explained that "Congress, in enacting
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 'did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy
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standing, determining that the players failed to meet the require-
ment of proving that they were appropriate antitrust plaintiffs. 110
The concurring opinion analyzed the players' claim under the fac-
tors used to determine whether a plaintiff is an appropriate anti-
trust plaintiff.11 After considering and balancing these factors,
Judge Trott concluded that the players "failed utterly" in proving
they were appropriate antitrust plaintiffs and therefore, had no
standing to bring their antitrust claim.11 2
V. CRrIcAL ANALYSIS
In light of the circumstances and legal precedent surrounding
the Hairston case, the Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the players' federal antitrust claim was appropri-
ate. 1 13 The court had ample authority for dismissing this claim on
in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust viola-
tion.'" Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California St. Coun-
cil, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)). The concurring opinion continued, "[t]hus, 'in
such case . . . the alleged injury [of a plaintiff] must be analyzed to determine
whether it is of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall.'" Id. at
1321 (Trott, J., concurring) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
California St. Council, 459 U.S. 519, 539 (1983)).
110. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1321. Judge Trott's concurring opinion listed
the following requirements for antitrust standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act:
"(1) . . . the plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered 'antitrust injury;' and
(2) ... the plaintiff must also show that he or she is an appropriate antitrust plain-
tiff." Id. (citations omitted).
111. See id. at 1321-22. The concurring opinion provided that the two general
factors are: (1) "how connected the players' injuries are to the alleged antitrust
violation;" and (2) "whether the players appropriately fulfill the private attorneys'
general function of the Clayton Act." Id. at 1321 (citations omitted). In addition,
the concurring opinion explained that it would consider a variety of other factors
including: "(1) the character of the damages, including the risk of duplicative re-
covery, the complexity of apportionment, and whether the damages' character
makes them too speculative; (2) the specific intent of the alleged conspiracy; (3)
the directness of the injury; and (4) the existence of other, more appropriate
plaintiffs." Id. at 1321-22 (citing I.C. Dick, 890 F.2d at 146).
112. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1322 (Judge TrottJ., concurring). Trott reasoned,
"[that] the practical consequences of allowing the players to bring this lawsuit after
the university-which has suffered enormous economic losses-has agreed to sanc-
tions, demonstrates that the players are not the proper antitrust plaintiffs .... " Id.
Rather, Judge Trott determined that UW was a far more appropriate party to bring
this antitrust suit. See id. at 1322-23.
Judge Trott's concurring opinion submitted that a finding that the players
had standing "would invite numerous groups of indirectly injured parties to bring
antitrust lawsuits ... ." Id. Judge Trott therefore announced, " ... because the
players lack antitrust standing, I would reverse the district court's published order
of May 20, 1994 [Hairston 1] which held to the contrary. In all other respects, I
concur in [the majority's] opinion." Id. at 1323.
113. For a discussion of the court's treatment of players' federal antitrust
claim, see supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
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its merits, rather than on the players' lack of antitrust standing.114
More importantly, the court correctly relied on NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,115 as the authority for its applica-
tion of the rule of reason analysis in this case, even though there
was a horizontal restraint of trade which normally triggers the per
se antitrust analysis.'1 6 The court properly applied the rule of rea-
son analysis in dismissing the players' antitrust claim when it held
that the players failed to show how the Pac-10 could accomplish the
procompetitive effects of sanctioning the UW football program in a
less restrictive manner.1 7 The players' federal antitrust claim,
therefore, was doomed ultimately by their inability to prove that the
Pac-10 imposed sanctions were disproportionate to UW's
violations." 8
The Hairston ruling raises the issue of whether courts leave the
NCAA and its member conferences too much power to regulate
and sanction the behavior of their member institutions by provid-
ing special treatment under federal antitrust law." 9 In Board of Re-
gents, the Court found that the NCAA's television plan violated
antitrust law.12 0 At the same time, the Court advocated using the
more lenient rule of reason analysis to decide antitrust claims in-
volving the NCAA, even though the NCAA frequently creates hori-
zontal restraints of trade.' 2 ' Under the traditional per se analysis, a
plaintiffs burden is greatly diminished, and in Hairston, the players
114. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1322-23.
115. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
116. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of rule of reason
analysis in antitrust claims involving NCAA regulations and rulings, see supra notes
64-71 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the court's application of the rule of reason analysis,
see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the inadequacy of the play-
ers' evidence, see supra note 98 and accompanying text. For independent authori-
ties' discussion of players' failure to provide evidence of the disproportionate
violations, see generally 9th Circuit Finds Pac-lO's Sanctions Not a Basis For Antitrust
Injury: Hairston v. Pacific-10 Conference, 22 ANDREWS SPORTS & ENT. LITG. REP.
(1997); Court Rejects Ex-Huskies' Antitrust Suit: Players Failed to Show Pac-lO Sanctions
Were Excessive, Court Rules, SrATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at C3.
119. For a discussion of Pac-10 regulation and enforcement procedures, see
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. Constitutional-based arguments also
raise this issue, as plaintiffs have argued NCAA regulations and rulings violate pro-
cedural due process guarantees. See supra note 70. (discussing cases bringing con-
stitutional-based challenges to NCAA rules and regulations).
120. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. For a complete discussion of the Supreme
Court's holding in Board of Regents, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of the traditional use of the per se analysis for horizontal
restraints of trade, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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may have been able to satisfy the requirement of showing antitrust
injury under the per se analysis. 122
Even if the players were able to meet their burden of showing
antitrust injury, their claim would still likely fail as the court would
ultimately reach the issue of the players' antitrust standing, which
according to the sound reasoning of the concurring opinion, the
players could not prove. 123 However, because the concurring opin-
ion is not binding precedent, 124 the majority opinion leaves open
the possibility of a successful claim by similarly situated plaintiffs, if
they could show that the member conference-imposed sanctions
were disproportionate to the institution's violations. 125 This is be-
cause the majority failed to address the standing issue, as raised by
the district court and the concurring opinion, and simply found
other grounds to dismiss the case. 126
By citing authority for the proposition that a court must decide
the antitrust standing issue before deciding the case on its merits,
the concurring opinion may have undercut the majority opinion to
122. Compare supra note 48 and accompanying text with supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text (illustrating diminished burden on plaintiff with per se analysis
as compared to rule of reason analysis). The Hairston court, however, could not
abandon the rule of reason analysis unless the plaintiff was able to distinguish
Board of Regents, which requires the application of the rule of reason analysis when
assessing restraints of trade within intercollegiate sports. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at
1319 (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-03); see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845
F.2d 1338, 1343-45 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Board of Regents as authority for using
rule of reason analysis in deciding federal antitrust challenges to NCAA rulings).
123. For a discussion of Judge Trott's concurring opinion that the players
lacked antitrust standing, see supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU-Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
668 (1989) (declining to treat previous concurring opinion as precedent because
it was not opinion of majority). The Court held, "[ilt has never been my under-
standing that a concurring opinion 'suggest[ing] a clarification of our ... doc-
trine,' could take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by [a majority]
of the Court." Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
125. See generally, Associated Press, Court Rejects Ex-Huskies'Antitrust Suit: Players
Failed to Show Pac-lO Sanctions Were Excessive, Court Rules, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 4,
1996, at C3. The Seattle Times article explained, "[t]he court declined to decide
whether a player could ever challenge a conference penalty against an athletic
program on antitrust grounds, saying there was no need to resolve that issue in this
case." Id. This article notes that the concurring opinion directly addressed this
issue by declaring that these players, and those similarly situated could not bring a
federal antitrust claim against their conference because they lack antitrust stand-
ing. See id.
126. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318. The Hairston court paid lip-service to the
district court's finding that the players have antitrust standing, "[a]llthough we are
not persuaded by the reasoning in the district court's opinion, we need not decide
whether appellants have met the requirements for antitrust standing, because they
have failed to establish any violation of the antitrust laws." Id. (citation omitted).
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an extent. 127 The issue of whether antitrust standing is a threshold
requirement appears unresolved in the Ninth Circuit, as cases cited
by the majority and the concurring opinion seem to clash on
whether the plaintiff must establish antitrust standing before the
court can reach the merits.12 8 While this is a relevant issue to this
case, it probably would not have changed the outcome as it is likely
that the court would have dismissed the players' antitrust claim for
lack of antitrust standing whenever it reached that question. 129
The court's treatment of the players' breach of contract claim,
though given short shrift, is also internally consistent.1 30 The court
was correct in ruling that the players' claim under the third-party
beneficiary theory failed because they could not prove they were
intended beneficiaries of the "contract" between UW and the Pac-
10.131 The court properly concluded that the language cited by the
players from the Pac-10 Materials did not create obligations to the
players as intended beneficiaries, and therefore, there was no con-
tract from which they could base a breach of contract claim.1 32
127. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320-23 (Trott, J., concurring). For a discussion
of the concurring opinion's authority for treating antitrust standing as the only
threshold element, see supra note 108. Specifically, the concurring opinion cites
to the Ninth Circuit's decision in .C. Dick which held that "[e]stablishment of
[antitrust] standing, logically precedes the presentation of a plaintiffs case" and
analogized antitrust standing to getting to first base before scoring a run. Id. at
1322 (citing R.C. Dick Geothermal v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 152 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
128. Compare supra note 89 and accompanying text, with supra note 108 and
accompanying text (demonstrating how Ninth Circuit appears to adopt conflicting
rules on whether antitrust standing is only threshold element or whether court can
decide antitrust case on its merits before reaching antitrust standing issue).
129. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining that even if court
determined plaintiffs met burden of showing antitrust injury, court would still have
to decide issue of plaintiffs' antitrust standing).
130. For a discussion of the court's dismissal of the players' breach of contract
claim for their failure to establish that they were third-party beneficiaries of the
contract between the Pac-10 and UW (as embodied in the Pac-10 Materials), see
supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the State of Washington's third-party beneficiary test,
see supra notes 59-60. Like the State of Washington, most states have adopted the
Restatement of Contracts Section 302 as the rule for the third party beneficiary
theory. See, e.g., Grigerik v. Sharpe, 699 A.2d 189 (Conn. App. 1997) (adopting
Restatement of Contracts Section 302 in Connecticut); Moore Const. Co., Inc. v.
Clarksville Dep't of Electricity, 707 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1985) (adopting Restate-
ment of Contracts Section 302 in Tennessee); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744
(Pa. 1983) (adopting Restatement of Contracts Section 302 in Pennsylvania).
132. For a discussion of the court's dismissal of players' third-party beneficiary
breach of contract claim, see supra notes 99-104.
1998]
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VI. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's primary holding in Hairston is a logical ex-
tension of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents, which
provided the NCAA wide latitude to create horizontal restraints of
trade over its member institutions. 133 As a result, when faced with
antitrust challenges to member conference-imposed sanctions,
courts in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions that adopt Hair-
ston will rely on the Supreme Court's Board of Regents decision and
likewise apply the rule of reason analysis, which protects restraints
of trade as long as they are reasonable.13 4
This line of decisions will likely have minimal impact on other
areas of antitrust law, as the uniqueness of intercollegiate athletics
severely limits the applicability of these cases outside this context.135
This case is instructional to the antitrust lawyer, however, because it
is an example of a court's willingness to tailor antitrust law to ac-
commodate necessary restraints of trade within a specialized
industry. 13 6
The Hairston court's analysis of the players' federal antitrust
claim highlights the inadequacy of the players' arguments, 13 7 and at
the same time teaches valuable lessons for future similarly situated
plaintiffs.1 38 For example, it appears that the players' arguments
might have been more persuasive had they offered evidence of
133. For a discussion of the Board of Regents decision, see supra notes 64-68.
This latitude is derived from the court's application of the rule of reason analysis
to an NCAA member-conference's horizontal restraint of trade. See NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
The breach of contract claim was a basic application of third-party beneficiary
theory and adds nothing new outside its specific application to this case. For a
discussion of the court's third-party beneficiary analysis used in Hairston, see supra
notes 99-104.
134. For a discussion of the Board of Regents decision, see supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text. For discussion of the impact of the Board of Regents deci-
sion, see generally, Meyers & Horowitz, supra note 66; Heller, supra note 1.
135. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (discussing unique and special
context of NCAA and intercollegiate athletics).
136. See id.
137. For a complete discussion of the contradictory nature of the evidence
offered by the players in their antitrust claim, see supra note 98 and accompanying
text. For example, the evidence offered by the players to support their federal
antitrust claim included testimony by a law professor who indicated that the Pac-10
penalties were within an appropriate range and an NCAA report that stated that
the Pac-10 sanctions on UW were too lenient. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319.
For a complete discussion of the contradictory nature of the evidence offered
by the players in their breach of contract claim, see supra notes 99-104 and accom-
panying text.
138. See generally Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (analyzing failures of players' fed-
eral antitrust claim).
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other institutions that committed more serious violations of NCAA
regulations, but received less severe sanctions.139 In addition, to
enhance their conspiracy argument, the players could have more
strongly emphasized the inherent conflict of interest within the Pac-
10 Council, which is composed of officials from UW's rival schools,
yet is vested with the authority to impose crippling sanctions with
little review by a neutral, detached party. 140
While the court's legal analysis of the players' case in Hairston
was sound, the decision seems unjust because it leaves the UW foot-
ball players who appeared to be unduly punished, without remedy
or recourse.14 1 The sanctions the Pac-10 imposed on U3W were for
violations committed in the 1980's and early 1990'S;142 however, it
was the players succeeding the violators in UW's football program,
139. See, e.g., Broyles, supra note 62, at 487, 499-503 (discussing NCAA viola-
tions committed by Auburn University and resulting NCAA-imposed sanctions). In
1993, Auburn University was sanctioned by the NCAA for committing numerous
NCAA rules violations including: (1) cash payments to players by Auburn assistant
football coaches, athletic department administrators and other representatives of
Auburn's athletics; (2) playing ineligible players; (3) providing extra grant-in-aid
to players; and (4) general failure to oversee football program. See Bruce Lowitt,
Auburn Penalized by NCAA, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at 1C. As com-
pared UW, the NCAA imposed the following less severe sanctions on Auburn de-
spite its more serious infractions: (1) a one-year ban on conference championship
and post-season play; (2) a two-year probation; (3) a one-year television ban; and
(4) a three-year reduction of available grants-in-aid (scholarships). See id. For fur-
ther discussion of the impact of the Auburn sanctions, see George Diaz, Auburn
Finishes Season Undefeated Because of NCAA Sanctions, the Tigers Aren't Eligible for a Bowl
Despite an 11-0 Mark, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1993, at C3; Mike Dame, Despite
NCAA Sanctions, Auburn Still has an Agenda, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 1993, at
D8; Steve Wieberg, Auburn Hit Hard by NCAA Sanctions, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1993,
at Cl; cf Broyles, supra note 62, at 497-99, 503-07 (discussing NCAA's sanctioning
of University of Kentucky and University of Nevada-Las Vegas).
140. For discussion of Pac-10's regulatory procedures, see supra notes 29-31.
A similar issue was raised in Blalock v. Ladies Profl Golf Ass'n (LPGA), where the
court held that a golfer's one-year suspension imposed by the LPGA's Executive
Board was invalid under federal antitrust law. See 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D.
Ga. 1973). In declaring the suspension invalid, the court pointed to several factors
including: (1) the player's good standing in the LPGA; (2) the LPGA's Executive
Commmittee's "unfettered, subjective discretion" in imposing sanctions on its play-
ers; and (3) the fact that the LPGA's Executive Committee was comprised of other
LPGA golfers who stood to gain a competitive advantage by excluding the sus-
pended player from the golf tour. Id. at 1265. The players in Hairston could have
used this case, as the factors considered by the Blalock court, especially the fact that
the sanctions were imposed by a body comprised of the golfer's competitors, were
also present in the Hairston case. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1317-18.
141. See generally supra note 70 (discussing constitutional-based challenges of
NCAA regulations and rulings). In this context, many plaintiffs have raised consti-
tutional arguments, especially procedural due process challenges to the system of
discipline employed by the NCAA. See id.
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like the plaintiffs in Hairston, who were forced to suffer the
consequences. 14
3
The facts of this case highlight the inadequacies of the NCAA's
system of enforcement where the NCAA and its member confer-
ences are given the broad authority to sanction an institution's ath-
letic program for NCAA rules violations. 144 While the NCAA or a
member institution can suspend or declare ineligible individual
players who commit NCAA violations, 1 45 it is the athletic program
that often suffers the brunt of the consequences, even when, as in
UW's case, the violations were not committed directly by the pro-
gram's administration and were, for the most part, beyond that ad-
ministration's control.146 The decision in Hairston, therefore,
continues the judicial trend, as established by the Supreme Court
in Board of Regents, of upholding reasonable regulations and sanc-
tions within intercollegiate athletics when they can be shown to
"foster ] competition among amateur athletic teams.' '1 4 7
In light of the clear and well-established line of pro-NCAA pre-
cedent spawned by the Board of Regents decision and the futility of a
third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim under these cir-
cumstances, the players' suit against the Pac-10 in reality, appears to
have been doomed from the start; 1 48 this suit thus demonstrates the
frustrations felt by innocent victims in a system where the group is
punished for the independent transgressions of the few.149 In con-
clusion therefore, notwithstanding creative uses of contract law, un-
less the Supreme Court retreats from its current view that
horizontal restraints imposed by the NCAA are generally subject to
143. See Eric Olson, Lambright Kept Huskies Afloat in Sea of Troubles, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Sept. 14, 1997, at IC.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing Billy Joe
Hobert's loss of NCAA eligibility for accepting loan in violation of NCAA regula-
tions). Despite losing his college eligibility, Hobert was drafted into the National
Football League and has enjoyed an undistinguished, but financially rewarding
professional football career. See generally Lars Anderson, AFC East Scouting Report:
Buffalo Bills, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED PRO FOOTBALL '97, Fall 1997, at 130-31 (discuss-
ing Hobert's position as back-up quarterback for Buffalo Bills and overall lacklus-
ter NFL career).
146. For a discussion of UW's NCAA rule violations and resulting sanctions
imposed by the Pac-10, see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
147. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
found that the NCAA television plan was unreasonable under the rule of reason
analysis because it did not further this goal. See id. at 120.
148. For the concurring opinion's characterization of the players' antitrust
claim as frivolous, see Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1321 (Trott, J., concurring).
149. For a discussion of the facts of Hairston, see supra notes 17-35 and accom-
panying text.
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the rule of reason analysis, federal courts like the Ninth Circuit in
Hairston, will continue to line up behind the Board of Regents deci-
sion and allow the NCAA and its member conferences virtual free
reign under federal antitrust law to discipline member institutions'
athletic programs. 150
Michael H. Gold
150. For a general discussion of antitrust issues within intercollegiate athlet-
ics, see supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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